The Dictator's Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party's Strategy for SurvivalOxford University Press, 2016 M05 16 - 256 pages Many observers predicted the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party following the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989, and again following the serial collapse of communist regimes behind the Iron Curtain. Their prediction, however, never proved true. Despite minor setbacks, China has experienced explosive economic growth and relative political stability ever since 1989. In The Dictator's Dilemma, eminent China scholar Bruce Dickson provides a comprehensive explanation for regime's continued survival and prosperity. Dickson contends that the popular media narrative of the party's impending implosion ignores some basic facts. The regime's policies may generate resentment and protest, but the CCP still enjoys a surprisingly high level of popular support. Nor is the party is not cut off from the people it governs. It consults with a wide range of specialists, stakeholders, and members of the general public in a selective yet extensive manner. Further, it tolerates and even encourages a growing and diverse civil society, even while restricting access to it. Today, the majority of Chinese people see the regime as increasingly democratic even though it does not allow political competition and its leaders are not accountable to the electorate. In short, while the Chinese people may prefer change, they prefer that it occurs within the existing political framework. In reaching this conclusion, Dickson draws upon original public opinion surveys, interviews, and published materials to explain why there is so much popular support for the regime. This basic stability is a familiar story to China specialists, but not to those whose knowledge of contemporary China is limited to the popular media. The Dictator's Dilemma, an engaging synthesis of how the CCP rules and its future prospects, will enlighten both audiences, and will be essential for anyone interested in understanding China's increasing importance in world politics. |
From inside the book
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Page x
... corrupt officials, governance failures, and public protest? Above all, how secure is the Party's hold on power? Will its strategy for survival prove to be indefinitely successful, or simply postpone its inevitable demise? Answers to ...
... corrupt officials, governance failures, and public protest? Above all, how secure is the Party's hold on power? Will its strategy for survival prove to be indefinitely successful, or simply postpone its inevitable demise? Answers to ...
Page 1
... critics, is riddled with corrupt and venal officials, and is in danger of collapse if it does not sustain rapid economic growth. That image contains much that is true, 1 1. Introduction: The CCP's Strategy for Survival.
... critics, is riddled with corrupt and venal officials, and is in danger of collapse if it does not sustain rapid economic growth. That image contains much that is true, 1 1. Introduction: The CCP's Strategy for Survival.
Page 2
... corrupt, and dysfunctional aspects of the regime. Those who have predicted collapse and democratization rightly noted the challenges facing the regime, but wrongly discounted its ability to adapt to changing conditions. Like all ruling ...
... corrupt, and dysfunctional aspects of the regime. Those who have predicted collapse and democratization rightly noted the challenges facing the regime, but wrongly discounted its ability to adapt to changing conditions. Like all ruling ...
Page 8
... corruption, pollution, inequality, unemployment—that not only accompany rapid growth but also trigger resentment and public protest. In fact, in contrast to the conventional wisdom that economic. 8 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W ...
... corruption, pollution, inequality, unemployment—that not only accompany rapid growth but also trigger resentment and public protest. In fact, in contrast to the conventional wisdom that economic. 8 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W ...
Page 13
... corrupt and venal officials, who undermine the Party's claims to legitimacy. On the other hand, providing public goods addresses societal needs not met by growth alone, potentially benefits a wider range of the population, and may ...
... corrupt and venal officials, who undermine the Party's claims to legitimacy. On the other hand, providing public goods addresses societal needs not met by growth alone, potentially benefits a wider range of the population, and may ...
Contents
1 | |
2 The Heavy Hand of the State | 31 |
3 Mass Line for Modern Times | 96 |
4 Serving the People | 164 |
5 Generating Support | 214 |
6 Defining Democracy | 262 |
7 Will the Party Survive? | 301 |
Appendices | 323 |
Bibliography | 327 |
Index | 341 |
Other editions - View all
The Dictator's Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party's Strategy for Survival Bruce Dickson Limited preview - 2016 |
The Dictator's Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party's Strategy for Survival Bruce J. Dickson No preview available - 2018 |
Common terms and phrases
accessed January 27 authoritarian authoritarian regimes Beijing Cambridge University Press campaign CCP’s censorship central challenge China China New York China’s leaders Chinese government Chinese political Chongqing cities civil society civil society groups Communist Confucian Contemporary China corruption countries critical Cultural Revolution Dalai Lama debate democracy in China democratic Deng Xiaoping economic growth economic reforms elections elites focus group foreign freedoms Fuping goals government officials government’s Guangzhou healthcare Hu Jintao hukou improve income institutions Internet legitimacy less level of democracy levels of regime Li Yapeng Maoist mass line ment migrants NGOs one-child policy organizations participants Party and government Party members Party’s survival strategy people’s congress percent political reforms Political Support Survey political system popular support promoting protests public opinion regime change regime support repression respondents social spending state’s Tibet Tibetans tion urban Uyghurs Xi Jinping Xinjiang