Transforming Microfinance Institutions: Providing Full Financial Services to the PoorWorld Bank Publications, 2006 M08 30 - 566 pages In response to a clear need by low-income people to gain access to the full range of financial services including savings, a growing number of microfinance NGOs are seeking guidelines to transform from credit-focused microfinance organizations to regulated deposit-taking financial intermediaries. In response to this trend, this book presents a practical 'how-to' manual for MFIs to develop the capacity to become licensed and regulated to mobilize deposits from the public. 'Transforming Microfinance Institutions' provides guidelines for regulators to license and regulate microfinance providers, and for transforming MFIs to meet the demands of two major new stakeholders regulators and shareholders. As such, it focuses on developing the capacity of NGO MFIs to mobilize and intermediate voluntary savings. Drawing from worldwide experience, it outlines how to manage the transformation process and address major strategic and operational issues inherent in transformation including competitive positioning, business planning, accessing capital and shareholders, and how to 'transform' the MFI's human resources, financial management, MIS, internal controls, and branch operations. Case studies then provide examples of developing a new regulatory tier for microfinance, and how a Ugandan NGO transformed to become a licensed financial intermediary. This book will be invaluable to regulators and microfinance NGOs contemplating institutional transformation and will be of tremendous use to donors and technical support agencies supporting MFIs in their transformation. |
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Common terms and phrases
ACCION ACCION International accounts ACLEDA Bank addition analysis assessment assets auditors balance Bank of Uganda Bolivia borrowers business plan capital adequacy cash central bank CGAP chapter cial clients costs customer service debt deposit accounts deposit-taking institution deposits documentation donors ensure entity equity example external financial institutions financial intermediary FINCA Uganda framework funds governance human resources institution’s interest rates internal audit internal controls investment investors issues Kampala Kenya liabilities licensed liquidity loan portfolio market research ment MFI needs MFI’s microcredit Microfinance Institutions MicroSave monitoring offer operations organization ownership percent policies potential procedures regulated financial regulated MFI regulatory reporting requirements risk management savers savings products senior management shareholders shares Shorebank Source stakeholders strategy structure supervision supervisor target teller tion trans transactions transfer transformation plan transforming MFI typically Uganda
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Page 375 - Internal control is broadly defined as a process, effected by an entity's board of directors, management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the following categories: • Effectiveness and efficiency of operations. • Reliability of financial reporting. • Compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
Page 387 - Internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and improve an organization's operations. It helps an organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes.
Page 407 - The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is a Committee of banking supervisory authorities which was established by the central bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries in 1975. It consists of senior representatives of bank supervisory authorities and central banks from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. It usually meets at the Bank for International Settlements in Basle, where its permanent Secretariat...
Page 407 - It consists of senior representatives of bank supervisory authorities and central banks from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. It usually meets at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, where its permanent Secretariat is located.
Page 325 - OECD (unless denominated in national currency — and funded in that currency — see above) (d) Claims on commercial companies owned by the public sector (e) Premises, plant and equipment and other fixed assets...
Page 268 - ... transaction or arrangement. c. After exercising due diligence, the governing board or committee shall determine whether the Organization can obtain with reasonable efforts a more advantageous transaction or arrangement from a person or entity that would not give rise to a conflict of interest. d. If a more advantageous transaction or arrangement is not reasonably possible under circumstances not producing a conflict of interest, the governing board or committee shall determine by a majority vote...
Page 325 - Cash b. Claims on central governments and central banks denominated in national currency and funded in that currency c. Other claims on OECD central governments and central banks d. Claims...
Page 268 - ... b. The names of the persons who were present for discussions and votes relating to the transaction or arrangement, the content of the discussion, including any alternatives to the proposed transaction or arrangement, and a record of any votes taken in connection with the proceedings. Article V Compensation a.
Page 267 - The purpose of the conflict of interest policy is to protect this tax-exempt organization's (Organization) interest when it is contemplating entering into a transaction or arrangement that might benefit the private interest of an officer or director of the Organization or might result in a possible excess benefit transaction.
Page 268 - If the governing board or committee has reasonable cause to believe a member has failed to disclose actual or possible conflicts of interest, it shall inform the member of the basis for such belief and afford the member an opportunity to explain the alleged failure to disclose.